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“May the Muses give me gracious aid to light such a beacon of song.”
— Pindar, Isthmia 4, 8.1, trans. Lattimore
CHAPTER I
Without any preparation let us pose to ourselves a metaphysical 
question: V/hy is there music? Perhaps in self-defense the answers
of the Romantic age come pouring out. Because the heart bursts forth 
in song. Because the soul seeks expression. Because music is a 
manifestation of longing after unattainable goals. Although these 
anst'Ters have the aroma of drâ /ring room nicety, they hint at a kind 
of psychological necessity, setting music up as a human instinct, 
admittedly irrational. Probing deeper into the past we come across 
the intriguing notion that the entire cosmos is fundamentally musical, 
that the world-order is in constant "harmony.”  ̂ This concept asserts 
that music is embodied by cosmological necessity, a kind of world- 
instinct, Though it illustrates a far-reaching rationalism, this 
concept also inflates the idea of music beyond comprehension; and
 ̂Cf. Edward A, Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece (Hew York; 
Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 1 ffT
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if the concept I'Tas intended to refer to this world-order, it invites 
reference to "the best of all possible world-orders" and thus gathers 
the aro’na of other-world line s s. Nevertheless, the concept of a world 
in harmony shows a closer concern for the question "V/hy is there 
music?" than does, say, the metaphor "The heart bursts forth in song," 
The latter may have satisfied an age with considerably more care and 
exuberance than ours, but the heart today which "bursts forth in song" 
must face the rejoinder: "iVho cares?" It is seldom put quite so
bluntly. More often we hear: "I respect your position." "Each to
his own taste," "Do your own thing, Baby." "Well, it*s not my bag, 
b u t , i n  any case the breadth of tolerance demonstrates a lack of 
care. Underneath the superficiality of ordinary language lies an 
admission to musical solipsism, which allows that music is egocentric 
to each individual, that music writ large is essentially a collection 
of individual tastes, and that musical agreement among individuals 
arises only by accident. Under such circumstances it would be absurd 
to claim that music is a universal language. Moreover, the possibility 
must now be raised that music is a non-essential activity. Its 
existence is called into question.
We ask again: Why is there music? How shall we ansx'Ter? Because
I will it? In that case I can cease to will it. Because somewhere 
out there a heart is singing? Whose heart? Singing what? Who cares? 
Because God saw fit to grant man a means of praising Him? Still, 
man can abandon this means; he can avoid music. Or worse yet, the 
giver can withdraw the means. If the question "Why is there music?"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
is too annoying, we can, if we wish, inundate the question with clever 
semantic manipulation. We might in this case first insist on forcing 
a definition of "music." Then we could attempt to prove either that 
the question is circular (i.e., that the answer is already in the 
question), or that through failure to arrive at a satisfactory de­
finition of "music," the question has no "meaning." Yet out of such 
a self-imposed dilemma the question would arise again unscathed,
iOrce more we ask: % y  is there music? We cannot rest content
with the ans>rer: Because there is music. Taking the existence of
music for granted amounts too easily to the tacit acceptance of a 
conceptual "package." We are interested in pursuing a manner in which 
the world, this world, appears to consciousness. Since the aim 
is to provide a basis for direct intuiting, it is necessary for us 
to lay aside our preconceptions about music. But preconceptions have 
a dogged persistence, almost as if they had a life of their own.
Hence to say "Lay aside your preconceptions" does neither guarantee 
nor yet even bring the expectation that the preconceptions will be 
laid aside. It is with this consideration that the term |music^ 
will continue to be used, though always now appearing as bracketed 
in order to remind us that the term m̂usic*J does not at this stage 
posit existence. The question "I'/hy is there ^music^ ?" must no’- 
be ansifered: Perhaps there is no ̂ music.]
By Intention, this bracketing of the conceptual subject matter 
is a procedure of the phenomenological method. The bracketing,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
which indicates a suspension of belief, is called the epochs (inyGreek, , a check, cessation).
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CHAPTER II 
PHE^mMËMOLOGY: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
The pheno'nenological method, as a distinct method so named, 
has arisen principally through the efforts of the German philosopher 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). The method, as it was begun and as it 
continues to develop, may be described as an attempt to deliver 
philosophy from the poverty of specialization and from the curse 
of abstraction. By implication, and later through application, the 
phenomenological method extends into every discipline. By virtue 
of its aim the method encompasses the whole of human activity, since 
the first consideration is to explicate the structure of human con­
sciousness, and in doing this, to disclose the phenomena as phenomena 
which we recognize as the "objects" of our consciousness.
It should be clear that the phenomenological method is directed 
always to the activity of consciousness and never to the abstract 
concepts a£ concepts which are thought of as symbolizing an activity; 
i.e., insofar as a concept is considered at all, it must necessarily 
be considered i-rithin the context of consciousness— it is a concept 
as formulated, or ̂  judged, or a£ perceived, or ^  remembered, etc.
By attending to concepts (or any other "object" of consciousness) 
in this manner, the thing attended to is always grounded in concreteness,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Significantly, the phenomenological method cannot become a closed 
body of philosophical dogma. It is a search for essences, though not 
in the Platonic tradition. Far from being immutable gems of intelligible 
being, phenomenological essences disclose themselves in the process 
of explication. Once disclosed, the essence does not then become 
the property of a fixed body of knowledge— to be given its place on 
the intellectual shelf, as it were, A phenomenological essence is 
accessible only during and through the context of investigating 
particular phenomena.
Besides Edmund Husserl, phenomenology as a recognizable movement 
embraces the thought and writings of such men as Martin Heidegger,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre and Gabriel Marcel, to name 
just a few. These men have concentrated largely on major traditional 
philosophical problems; being, time, perception, nothingness, etc.
These problems occupy a primary place in phenomenology because 
they stand at the core of all experience. However, we must not suppose 
that these initial investigations are like building blocks upon which 
later investigation rests. Each new investigation must begin at the 
beginning; in no sense do phenomenologists compile a body of knowledge.
If we wish to apply a concept to indicate what a phenomenological 
investigation is, let us say that it is a journey rather than a con­
struction project.
While it is impossible to give a concise definition of the 
phenomenological method, we might consider a few of its characteristics. 
Positively speaking it is an invitation "to turn toward phenomena
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
vhich had been blocked from sight by the theoretical patterns in 
front of them, *'2 Negatively it stands in protest to such preconcep­
tions as Ockham’s razor (the principle of simplicity or economy of
thought, sometimes called reductionism) and dogmatic empiricism, 
which restricts experience to sense data alone. Yet even this 
negative aspect of the phenomenological method yields a positive 
result, since it is the preconceptions and habits of thought that 
narrow down our experience, and by exposing these habits, we may 
once again come to view phenomena in all their fullness,^
Any phase of [rausicallj experience could be examined phenomen- 
ologically. That the method is peculiarly well suited to the topic 
of this paper should become evident as we proceed. An explanation 
of this suitability is withheld for the present because it might raise 
a preconception which would endanger the effectiveness of the method. 
Research concerned with pnusic^ of the ancient Greeks has 
suffered from two factors: the nearly complete lack of surviving
notational examples and the propensity to view ancient Greek ||r7iuslĉ
through their theoretical writings about ĵ musio]̂  The first factor 
precludes the re-creation of ancient Greek [music at least with 
any claim to historical authenticity. The second factor often tends
2 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, A 
Historical Introduction (2nd ed., The Hague; liartinus Nijhoff,
1965), II. p. 658.
3 Ibid., II, pp. 653-701.
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to produce exercises in constructing abstract theoretical systems 
in vhlch it is sometimes difficult to distinguish betveen what is 
applicable to the Greeks and what is only applicable to the system 
per se.
To consider Kwakiutl Indian culture in mutual thematic context 
with the ancient Greek affords the opportunity of viewing archaic 
l̂ musical^ phenomena in a variety of juxtapositions. With respect 
to the ancient Greeks, we shall center our attention upon the remnants 
of songs, i.e., poetry, to see what j^musicalj phenomena are described. 
With respect to the Kwakiutl, we have detailed information of jmusica]^ 
phenomena from the personal recollections of individual Kwakiutl 
Indians, from the data gathered by anthropologists (most notably 
Franz Boas), and from the recordings of Kwakiutl songs collected 
by musicologist Dr, Ida Halpem,^
In spite of all this information on the Kwakiutl, there are 
some rather serious problems. Kwakiutl personal recollections 
often appear in quite oversimplified English, often in a somewhat 
jerky and imprecise grammatical fashion. Anthropologists have not 
wished to tamper t>dth their data in the interest of maintaining 
"authenticity;" as scientists they feel so compelled. However, the 
native Kwakiutl language is rich in concrete expressions, to such an 
extent that the oversimplified accounts in English do not convey very
4 Ida Halpern (songs collected by), Indian Music of the Pacific 
Northwest Coast, Folkvrays Ethnic Library FE ^523 (New York: Foïïô’ays
Records and Service Corporation, 19^7).
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successfully the power inherent in the native tongue. Consequently 
one runs the risk that these Kwakiutl accounts might too easily be 
regarded in terms of the noble savage, simple life stereotype. To 
say that the life of a Kwakiutl was not simple is certainly an under­
statement, We must make every effort to keep this stereotype from 
screening our understanding of the material.
In terms of historicity we shall be dealing with the ancient 
Greeks ca, 800-400 B.C. and i-̂ lth the Kwakiutl Indians of the 19th 
and 20th centuries A.D, Information on the two cultures presented 
in juxtaposition is intended to raise the possibility that each may 
complement the other, somewhat in the manner of jniusical̂  counter­
point, Although this procedure might be referred to as the compar­
ative technique, I vrish to guard against any preconception of a 
one-to-one relationship between the two cultures; I also do not want 
to self-impose the limitation of mere factual similarities.
If this technique produces yet a third "jmusicanj culture," 
which is neither ancient Greek nor Kwakiutl Indian, then it is 
in that third "jmusicalj culture" that the phenomenological essence 
may disclose itself.
One major presupposition ought to be exposed. The author owes 
a potlatch to Kircea Eliade, whose extensive scholarship might very 
well be called a Phenomenology of Myth, The experience of reading 
M. Eliade*s books has opened avenues of awareness vdthout which 
this thesis would not be what it is.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER III 
SOME PHENOMEKOLOGICAL DISTINCTIONS
The decision to use the term "archaic" to describe the ancient 
Greek and Kvakiutl cultures vas based on the etymology of the vord.
In the ancient Greek (arche) means "a beginning or origin" and
also "the first place or power, sovereignty, dominion, command,"5 
The two cultures here under investigation are both "archaic" in the 
sense that their mode of living points, by intention, to its origins. 
This is evident throughout the sources of information, whether 
litsraiy, archaeological, anthropological, or ||musicalj Although 
Martin P. Nilsson has said that "primitive mentality (I would prefer 
to say ’archaic mentality* here) is a fairly good description of the 
mental behavior of most people today except in their technical or 
consciously intellectual activities," surely it is in terras of our 
technical/intellectual activities that our culture may be specifically 
said to be our culture, and not some other. The point is, ours is 
not an "archaic" culture, since the conscious intention of our
5 Liddell and Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, 
founded upon the 7th ed. of Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, I96I),
6 Quoted by E.R, Dodds in The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley; 
University of California Press, 1968), p. viii.
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technical/intellectual activities is directed at playing down or 
even eliminating these ’’archaic" tendencies. But the observation that 
"primitive (or archaic) mentality" abounds in our culture is evidence 
that the present phenomenological investigation is possible; i.e., 
it is because of our ability to tap our own archaic consciousness that 
we may be able to disclose and explicate a phenomenological essence 
of archaic Qnusic.^ Certainly our ^musical] culture of today is 
not predominately an archaic j^musical] culture.
Another term which will be used extensively throughout this 
paper is "myth" or "mythical". There is considerable risk involved 
in the use of this terra, "Kyth" must be understood as meaning an 
account of origins. But it is more than just an account, for myth 
must be considered as a phenomenon— e, g., myth as it is exemplified 
in ritual. Thus it is not easy to distinguish between the account 
of origin and the origin as itself an original event, or to put it 
another way, between the medium and the message. It is not entirely 
clear whether or not archaic man made the distinction between myth 
as ritual (commemorating a mythical event) and myth as mythical event; 
perhaps for archaic man the ritual i_s the original event. Notice 
that to say "The singer the song" is not the same thing as saying 
"It*s the singer, not the song," In the latter case one submits to 
dogmatic empiricism.
It is my considered judment that the foregoing question should 
be viewed in the light of Husserl*s phenomenological investigation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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into the structure of consciousness,*^ Taking myth and ritual as 
exemplifications of identity and multiplicity, ve make the following 
case, A given myth (as original event) exemplifies identity; i,e,, 
it is presented to the consciousness as that myth and no other, Then 
consider the multiplicity of possible rituals which commemorate that 
myth. To the archaic understanding, and to our own as well, a ritual 
is an act of remembering. Any remembering and the thing remembered 
are always presented to the consciousness together; i,e«, identity 
and multiplicity are presented as coexistent. To separate the two 
as individual concepts requires a further act of consciousness.
Even an imperfect remembering (or partial forgetting) is presented 
to the consciousness coexistent with its corresponding thing re­
membered, In this instance the thing remembered (or to be remembered) 
appears as identical to itself as an intended perfect remembering. The 
point is, each ritual as an Instance of multiple events refers 
immediately to its intentional Identity: the myth as original mythical
event. The point holds true as long as ritual maintains its myth 
as its intentional "object" and particularly in the context of the 
oral tradition.
If the foregoing explication is clear, we should now be able to 
understand the meaning of myth as we shall use the word, Phenoraeno- 
logically we take myth to mean myth-and-ritual, for this is the manner
7 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, An Introduction to 
Phenomenology, trans, by Dorian Cairns (The'Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
i960), passim.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
in which myth is first presented to the consciousness— with identity 
and multiplicity as coexistent. Conceptually we take myth to mean the 
original mythical event £S it were something in Itself, but re­
membering from above that to formulate this concept— to extract 
identity from the given coexistence of identity and multiplicity—  
requires a further act of consciousness, and that this concept is 
not immediately given.
Perhaps the greatest risk in using the term "myth" in this 
investigation arises from its being commonly used in a perjorative 
sense to connote "a fabulous legend or false tale, as opposed to 
historical fact." For the purposes of this investigation (and for 
archaic man also), nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed,
Qarchaic man clearly distinguished between myth and legend. Legends 
"can be told anyichere and at any time, myths must not be recited 
except during a period of sacred tlme"^ It is easy to write off 
the importance of this distinction by calling in a handy concept; 
taboo. This term is popularly perjorative too, evidently on the 
assumption that a taboo is grounded in irrationality or superstitious 
belief. In some cases this may be so, but not with respect to the 
taboo against the irresponsible recitation of myth.
Aron GujT’dtsch distinguishes two sectors of consciousness:
o Mircea Eliade, Kyth and Reality, trans, by Willard R, Trask 
(New York: Harper and Row, I968), pp, 8 ff.
9 Ibid., p. 10,
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thematic and m a r g i n a l . T h e  thematic field of consciousness consists 
of whatever one is intentionally engaged vith at any given time—  
the intentional "object." The marginal field of consciousness con­
sists of whatever else one is conscious of at that same time, ^hich 
is not made thematic, but any of vhlch could be made thematic because 
it is there. This distinction is of course purely conceptual. There 
aren’t really tvo fields of consciousness, there is only consciousness 
itself. But the concepts may be useful in discussing hov the taboo 
against the recitation of myth vorks.
One of the problems with a taboo of this kind is the possibility 
of an "accidental" remembering of the myth, appearing either as if 
responding to some stimulus or simply coming forth through the 
memory as if by its own accord. The important point, I think^is 
whether any particular remembering of a myth remains in the marginal 
field of consciousness or whether that remembering is taken up as 
a direct intending, i.e., becoming thematic. And even if made thematic, 
the question remains, in what manner does the ityth appear? For only 
by undergoing the ritual can it be said that th^ myth is fully 
"recited," One must not recite the myth (i.e., do the ritual) except 
during the time and at the place that are proper to that myth. The 
practical significance of the taboo is that it preserves, by intention,
Aron GurvTitsch, Stûdies in Phenomenology and Psychology, 
trans. by Fred Kerston (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University
Press, 1966), pp. 200 ff. and pp. 26? ff.
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the concreteness of the myth-ritual. To violate the taboo, which 
the universally portable written tradition certainly makes possible 
by writing myths do>?n, is to invite abstractness and consequently 
to risk losing direct contact with this world,
A test case: When a myth appears in the context of its corres­
ponding ritual at a specific time and place, not only is that myth- 
ritual thematic to the consciousness, but also the specificity of that 
time and of that place extends the identity of that myth into the 
marginal consciousness. In this way, irrelevancies which may be 
lying in wait in the marginal consciousness are intended to be kept 
out of the thematic field entirely and to be crowded out of even the 
marginal field as far as this is possible.
Another case; When a myth appears in the context of its cor­
responding ritual but in a different (i,e,, non-specific) time and 
place, even though that myth-ritual may be thematic to the consciousness, 
the non-specificity of time and place present a special problem, 
particularly to the eye. In this case, irrelevant stimuli are con-
1 1stantly in the marginal field and quite easily can become thematic.^ 
Whenever there is an attempt on the part of the participants in a 
ritual to create an illusion, this may be regarded as a way of solving 
the problem,, A successful illusion, however, requires special
The Greek epic poet*s blindness might be introduced here to 
illustrate, however speculatively, that with regard to the recita­
tion of myth, when displaced by migration, blindness might be a 
definite asset to the preservation of the myth's identity.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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effort, and consequently is all too easily given up as not being 
worth the trouble, (The Kwakuitl winter ceremonial, rich in illusion, 
receded rather quickly after the invasion of Western civilization. 
There is a curious twist of irony here, Notice that the word "il­
lusion" means literally "a playing with".)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IV 
MYTHICAL TIME AND LANGUAGE
One feature of the modem Western world which we might re­
cognize as almost ubiquitous, at least in the proverbial humdrum 
work-a-day world, is our awareness of clock time. The seconds tick 
by with mathematical precision, and regardless of one*s personal 
orientation, or subjective time-consciousness, there is the notion that 
the relentlessly objective clock time is the norm par excellence 
against which all other appearances of time are measured.
Contrasted with this modem clock-time consciousness is archaic 
tirae-consciousness which consists of two radically different kinds 
of awareness of time.12 First, and to archaic man most excellent, 
is mythical time or sacred time. It is that time in the beginning 
(4V ) when exemplaiy models received their Being— looked upon
most often by archaic man as a divine gift. Archaic man^s second 
awareness of time is of historical or profane time. This is roughly 
equivalent to the modern concept of historical time, except that 
for archaic man, historical time means quite rapid decay. Little
12 This entire section on time is derived generally from Eliade*s 
Cosmos and History (New York: Harper and Row, 1959) and The Sacred
ân'â^the Profane "%New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), both trans.
by Willard R. Trask,
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more than one year of uninterrupted historical time would wear out 
the world. Consequently the primary function of the myth of eternal 
return is to negate historical time by entering sacred time and by 
re-enacting the myth of origin either really or symbolically through 
ritual.
This act of interpenetration of historical time by mythical time 
effects for archaic man a major advantage. It means that when he 
steps back out of mythical time into historical time, he enters a 
new historical time, one that is discontinuous with the previous 
historical time. This new one commences its decay immediately, but 
from a newly rejuvenated state.
Because of modern connotations, one might expect archaic man's 
awareness of mythical time to be of an ultra-serious nature and of 
historical time to be less serious. Actually it is more the reverse. 
Mythical time is playfully structured o’-ing to its playful events.
The cosmos, nature and the immortals are engaged in inter-play. When 
archaic man performs a ritual he enters the play-sphere.^^ His best 
and perhaps even his only means of entry is through Qnusic^ "vVhen 
a performer sings his sacred song his supernatural power becomes 
manifest.
13 Cf, Johan Huisinga, Homo Ludens, A Study of the Play-Element 
in Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 19&7), passim.
Franz Boas, Kwakiutl Culture as Reflected in Mythology, 
Memoirs of the American Folk-Lore Society, Vol. XXVIII (New York: 
G.E. Stechei^ and Co., 1935)» P. 83.
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At this point an aphorism is suggested: ^MusicJ of archaic
man is play.
The act of a myth-ritual is a kind-of time-machine. It is 
theoretically perfect just as the memory is theoretically perfect.
And as blind fate accounts for a lapse in memory, so does blind fate 
stop the mythical time-machine or send it off course. Archaic man 
realizes this and sometimes alludes to it with sadness. But so long 
as he maintains his contacts with mythical origins, he remains archaic 
man. To him, this contact is his source of dignity, as well as his 
identity. To forget this or to de-mythologiz© himself is to become 
historical man— to submit to death and decay.
Another feature of the modem Western world is our widespread 
propensity to distribute idle chatter. We tend to regard that which 
is written as somehow more important and more "meaningful” than 
that which is merely spoken. Thus a written work so often appears 
in triplicate. It might almost be said that we regard duplication 
(including Xerography, phonograph records and audio and video tape) 
as natural to the written tradition— indeed, as natural to language 
itself.
But to the archaic understanding language is, like other ex­
emplary models, a divine gift, to be handled with care and skill. 
Indiscriminate use of language within an oral tradition will soon 
clog up the memory until irrelevancies and abstract concepts send 
the oral tradition into decay.
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Historical time has a vearing effect on language, this much 
archaic man knew very veil. But there are two ways of looking at 
this, which in our categorical haste ve are apt to miss if ve simply 
subscribe to the concept: evolution of language. First, since
language depends largely upon memory for its continuity of meaning, 
any kind of forgetting can change the langiage. This forgetting may 
sometimes result in substituting, so that an approximation acts as 
a place setter, temporary and waiting to be discarded upon accurate 
recollection of the word(s) forgotten, 'when the linguistic place 
setter becomes permanent, through failure of the memory to correct 
it, we call that the evolution of language. In a language which is 
pretty thoroughly abstract, such as our own contemporary usage, the 
concept of evolution is perhaps fitting; but to archaic man, whose 
language is by nature concrete, the act of forgetting is an exem­
plification of decay, not of evolution.
Archaic man's language is grounded in concreteness. When for­
getting results in the introducing of a linguistic place setter, that 
place setter is abstract, much like the independent variable "x" 
in symbolic logic or algebra. Archaic man knows a responsibility, 
that of seeking to accurately recollect so that he can reinstate •':>e 
the concreteness and oust the abstract usurper,15
15 Someone once said, "I can make my words mean whatever I 
want them to mean— as long as I am consistent," This is language 
£>r language's sake. Let us not confuse consistency >:lth precision. 
Henri’Bergson's charge against philosophy is as much a charge against
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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•’There are many sharp shafts 
in the quiver 
under the crook of my arm.
They speak to the understanding; most men need 
. interpreters.
The wise man knows many things in his blood; the 
vulgar are taught.
They will say anything. They clatter like crows
against the sacred bird of Zeus."
— Pindar, Olympia 2, 13.3-14,1, trans. Lattimore,
Pindar*s imagery of archery is a good one, for it implies the
bull*s eye— taking the concept of precision as a concrete phenomenon,
Pindar must have been fond of the image; he used it again:
•'There are many arrows of song
my speech has skill to sound forth in their honor,•'
— Isthmia 5» 7-4-5* trans, Lattimore,
By the same image, consider mere logical consistency as, say, hitting 
three feet below the bull*s eye with amazing consistency,
A while ago the aphorism •• [jluslc] of archaic man is play^’ was 
offered. Another is now suggested: Since archaic man*s language
is concrete, it is playful, too. Archaic man*s language in its most 
precise way plays contrapuntally along with nature. Archaic nature
language usage, •'Iv’hat philosophy has lacked most of all is precision. 
Philosophical systems are not cut to the measure of the reality in which 
we live; they are too wide for reality. Examine any one of them, 
chosen as you see fit, and you will see that it could apply equally 
well to a world in which neither plants nor animals have existence, 
only men, and in which men '̂ ould quite possibly do without eating 
and drinking, where they would neither sleep nor dream nor let their 
minds wander; where, b o m  decrepit, they would end as babes-in-arms; 
where energy would return up the slope of its dispersion, and where 
everything might just as easily go back'^ards and be upside dot̂ n.̂ '
Henri Bergson, The Creative Kind, trans, by Mabelle L, Andison 
(New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1946), p, 11.
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is playful; archaic language is playful. In this fundamental sense 
we may say that ai?chaib language is an imitation of nature. Ono- 
matapoesis is a case in point.
Perhaps the most easily recognizable pattern of playfulness is 
repetition. Repetition by itself is suggestively comic. A trivial 
example is to repeat (a trivial example is to repeat) whatever some­
one else is saying (whatever someone else is saying). Need I say
more? (Need I ________?) It is possible to consider the repetition
in Homer’s epics primarily as a manifestation of playfulness, and 
only secondarily as a means of making them easier to remember.
Anyone who has watched the Rowan and Martin show should have 
recognized the tragi-comic duality manifested in the awarding of 
the "flying fickle finger of fate." The Greek poet Sappho presented 
herself with a similar award:
One need not understand Greek to recognize the playfulness exhibited 
by the fact that each of the words begins with the same letter " pt ". 
Translation into English yields a tragic lament: "neither for me
honey nor honeybee," and perhaps more precisely: "Now will I neither
taste honey nor even enjoy the comfort of the honeybee’s presence." 
(Trans, by the author.) In order to preserve the spirit of incan­
tation. one might go so far as to suggest "flying fickle finger of 
fate" as a translation of Sappho’s lament, even in the face of the 
linguistic arguments for not doing so.
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One of the clearest expressions of tragi-comic duality comes 
from Archilochus (ca, 680-640 B.C.);
Ct S e yw 0€ w V v’ ava kto ̂
I am these: A companion in arms to the warlike
leader (Ares) 
and one who understands the Fuses* beloved gift.
— Trans, by the author.
Archilochus is both soldier and songrnaker. The playfulness in his
craft as songrnaker is displayed in another fragment:
e v  S o ^ i  ftê(4 A r ^4ôVti, è v  S y i .
By spear my barley-cake is won (kneaded), by spear 
Ismaric wine,
I drink it, leaning against a spear.
— Trans, by the author.
That a tragic image, the spear, is used playfully, the translation
shows, but what it doesn’t show is the incantation-like repetition
in the first lins.
€V Scpi (ASV
' j(~" 2 ^ A S 1
Notice that six out of seven consecutive syllables (underscored) 
begin with the letter *' pi ". In Creek, the song begins as a table 
prayer, addressed to the spear itself, somewhat like: "0 Spear,
that brings to me my dally bread,*’ except that the phrase in Greek 
sounds more compelling. The songs of Archilochus display much
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vicious satire. In this fragment, too, I believe Archilochus is 
saying; ̂ ’’Spear, I grant you my respect; you serve me veil, Nov 
I charge you to bear the veight of my jokes.”
A young poet in Portland, Oregon, composed a poem:
’’Purple Cat 
Purple 
Cat
Purple Cat
Purple
Cat
Purple Cat 
Purple
1A ” etc.lo
This poem commemorates, or mimics, the sequence of presentation of 
a neon sign advertising a Portland pub. It is easy to imagine how 
historians might be puzzled by having the poem in hand long after 
its concrete referent was displaced by urban renewal. In this 
case the repetition in itself is all too obvious, but that is all 
that is obvious.
Source; the author’s ovm amazing memory.
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"From lovely Salamis I come a herald,
With a well-made song instead of talk,"
— Solon, Fr. 2, 1-2, trans, Bovra.
CHAPTER V 
GREEK HOUSIKÊ
In archaic culture the language of poets is still 
the most effective means of expression, with a function 
much wider and more vital than the satisfaction of literary 
aspirations. It puts ritual into words, it is the arbiter 
of social relationships, the vehicle of wisdom, justice 
and morality, ^11 this it does without prejudice to its 
play-character, for the setting of archaic culture itself 
is the play-circle,^7
To speak of a poet with respect to archaic culture is to speak 
of a songrnaker whose activity is to compose "mousike," The word 
••mousike" means literally "pertaining to the Muses." Hesiod identi­
fies the Muses as the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne (Memory),
(See Theogony
Come you then, let us begin from the Muses, who by 
their singing
delight the great mind of Zeus, their father, who lives 
on Olympos,
"as they tell of what is, and what is to be, and what 
was before now 
with harmonious voices, and the sound that comes sweet 
from their mouths 
never falters....
* * *
^7 Huizinga, Homo ludens, p. 134,
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and they 
in divine utterance 
sing first the glory of the majestic race of 
immortals 
from its beginning.,.,.
— Hesiod Theogony, 37-^5, trans. Lattimore,
In as much as the Muses "tell of what is, and what is to be, and what
was before now," they act as the exemplary model of the functions of
the human memory. Present events are capable of being remembered
(becoming a future event but referring back to a past event). Just
as Memory, mother of the Muses, is the exemplary model of the human
memory as an identity, so are the Muses the exemplary models of the
human memory in its multiplicities of rememberings. The identity
is a unit; the multiplicities are activities of identity. Let us
take care not to press ontological significance onto what Hesiod
presented as if chronologically; i,e,. Memory, as mother, prior to
the Muses, as daughters. From the archaic point of view, the events
described by Hesiod take place in mythical time, and in this context
the events occur all at One Time, It is significant that Hesiod begins
the Theogony, not with Chaos, but with the origin of the Muses, Chaos
must wait until line ll6.
When the early Greek songrnaker calls to the Muses directly,
his is an appeal for them to grant that his song be memorable.
Hail, then, children of Zeus: 
grant me lovely singing,
— Hesiod Theogony, 104, trans, Lattimore.
But the song is not really "his" song, for the song is executed through
his memory. He does not, however, have possession of his memory
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as he Taay be said to possess an ordinary utensil. Consider this song 
by Archilochus;
Some barbarian is waving my shield, since I was obliged 
to leave that perfectly good piece of equipment 
behind
under a bush. But I got away, so what does it matter?
Let the shield go; I can buy another one equally 
good,
— Trans, Lattimore
Can you imagine Archilochus* saying the same thing about his memory?
We are here dealing with the oral tradition, which depends upon the
memory of sound and rhythm. The songrnaker is, in effect, the medium
through whom the Kuses act.^®
Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus* son Achilleus 
and its devastation, which put pains thousandfold 
upon the Achaians,
— Homer Iliad, 1,1-2, trans, Lattimore,
Sing in me. Muse, and through me tell the story 
of that man skilled in all ways of contending, 
the wanderer, harried for years on end, 
after he plundered the stronghold 
on the proud height of Troy,
— Homer Odyssey, 1.1-5, trans, Fitzgerald,
In sum, the appeal says: Grant me Kousikê,
'
Mousikê to the ancient Greeks signifies an act of ritual. The 
songrnaker*s appeal to the Muses declares his intentions and his hopes; 
•Sing, Muses, and let mythical time interpenetrate historical time, 
that by this process rejuvenation will attend, and man, though mortal.
Charles Rowan Beye, The Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Kpic 
Tradition (Garden City, H.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966), pp. I5 ff,
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nay participate, howsoever briefly, in the immortality which is the
sole property of the happy and carefree gods.
At the serene king's word, a squire ran
to bring the polished harp out of the palace,
and place was given to nine referees—
peers of the realm, masters of ceremony—
who cleared a space and smoothed a dancing floor.
The squire brought dovm, and gave Demodokos
the clear-toned harp; and centering on the minstrel
magical young dancers formed a circle
with a light beat, and stamp of feet. Beholding,
Odysseus marvelled at the flashing ring.
Mow to his harp the blinded minstrel sang,
— Homer Odyssey, 8,25^-264, Trans, Fitsgerald,
There is a parallel in Kwakiutl practice, for example, the batons
to be used to beat time accompanying a song will be distributed with
great ceremony.
Here we see described Mousikê in the fullness of its concrete 
usage. Here we find verbal recollection, melodic recollection, and 
rhythmic recollection operating within a magic play-circle. It would 
be very nearly nonsense to speak of verbal, melodic and rhythmic as 
separate elements of ancient Greek Mousikê, The lowest common de­
nominator of Mousikê is the organic union itself, which our language
forces us to put clumsily as: êü ?,,• Even that^ r h y t h m
reprensentation is misleading, since it appears to indicate rhythm 
as the common denominator. If by common denominator we mean that 
the same rhythm permeates the melody, the verse and the dance, 
we may be correct, but there is a problem in viewing Mousikê in
Thrasybulos Georgiades, Greek Music, Verse, and Dance, trang, by 
Erwin Benedikt and Marie Louise Martinez (Mew York: Merlin Press, 1956},
passim.
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this manner. Take, for example, the Homeric oral tradition. One 
may speak of the rhythmic technique of epic hexameter as the under- 
lying structural system of the Homeric poems. But epic hexameter 
as an abstract concept, pure and simple, vill not of itself serve 
as a means of generating a Homeric epic— certainly not in terms of 
Mousikê, (No more than, say, a set of rules on the Bach chorale 
style, statistically derived from Bach's chorales, will generate 
another Bach chorale. What it will generate is a statistical chorale, 
but that is an entirely different game. To call the statistical 
chorale an "approximation" of a Bach chorale is idle mischief,)
Let us recall the Kwakiutl example introduced on the preceding 
page. The batons have been passed out, the singer begins his song, 
the people beat the batons (a kind of dance with the hands), and the 
singer's bodily movement is yet another dance. There are at least 
three different rhythms appearing simultaneously. Altogether they 
generate yet another overall rhythmic feeling, which can be remembered 
through an oral tradition, but in no way could one generate this 
overall rhythmic feeling from the verse text alone,
Homeric epic is generated through the memory. To the archaic 
understanding, the memory as a songmaking device is a divine gift.
To the twentieth century understanding, particularly with regard to 
the Parry-Lord theory of oral versemaking (see A.B, Lord, The Singer 
of Tales, based on an empirical investigation of Yugoslav epic), the 
epic poem is made possible by formulae; i.e., stock phrases, repetition.
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similies using similar metric units, etc. In our investigation 
•vie must adhere to the archaic unders'banding.
Consider the Kuses themselves as songmakers. Their function as 
described in the Theogony is to celebrate the origin of the gods in 
a ritual.
Let US begin our singing 
from the Helikonian Kuses 
vho possess the great and holy mountain 
of Helikon 
and dance there on soft feet 
by the dark blue water 
of the spring, and by the altar 
of the powerful son of Kronosj 
who wash their tender bodies in the waters 
of Permessos 
or Hippokrene, spring of the Horse, 
or holy Olmeios, 
and on the high places of Helikon 
have ordered their dances 
which are hancë’ome and beguiling,
/and light are the feet they move on.
From there they rise, and put a veiling 
of deep mist upon them, 
and walk in the night, singing
in svxeet voices, and celebrating 
Zeus,,,Hera,,,Athene,,.Apollo 
* * *
and all the holy rest of the everlating 
immortals,
— Hesiod, Theogony, 1-21, Trans. Lattimore, 
The Muses, .hs described here, do not just sing, for the ritual of 
preparation is as much a part of their singing as is finally the 
’’content"— celebrating the immortals. Speaking purely conceptually, 
one could outline the above passage so as to say: First the Muses
went through a rather elaborate ritual, during which they danced and 
bathed, then they sang about the gods, Ifhen put this way, one could 
easily bring forth a case when: Being pressed for time, the Muses
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now dispensed with their visual preparation and began immediately to 
sing of the gods. Such a case is of course only an imaginary violation 
of the original, and indeed the case is absurd, since "being pressed 
for time" while in mythical time makes no sense. But it illustrates 
how myth becomes mythology. Recalling the earlier discussion con­
cerning the initial co-existence of myth and ritual, we can see that 
in the present case also, in order to arrive at the Muses^ singing 
of the gods, pure and simply, without the prspartory ritual, we had 
to make the secondary act of consciousness— i.e., the act of separating 
the ritual from the song which follows. It illustrates another point, 
also, ThO" mythical event of the Muses as presented by Hesiod is a 
description of Mousikê, but after our o>rn act of separating the ritual 
and the song into distinct parts, we are left vdth a description of 
[muE%(^ in its basically abstract meaning.
Turning now from the Muses as songmakers, let us consider the 
human individual as songrnaker, Hesiod describes (more accurately 
perhaps, he commemorates) the actual gift of his craft.
And it was they (the Muses) who once taught Hesiod 
his splendid singing 
as he was shaperding his lambs 
on holy Helikon, 
and these were the first i-ords of all 
the goddesses spoke to me, 
the Kuses of Olympia, daughters of Zeus 
of the aegis:
*ïou shepherds of the wilderness, poor fools, 
nothing but bellies, 
we know how to say many false things 
that seem like true sayings, 
but we know also how to speak the truth 
when we wish to,*
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So they spoke, these mistresses of vords, 
daughters of great Zeus, 
and they broke off and handed me a staff 
of strong-growing 
olive shoot, a wonderful thing; ' 
they breathed a voice into me, 
and po'er to sing the story of things 
of the future, and things past.
They told me to sing the race
of the blessed gods everlasting, 
but always to put themselves
at the beginning and end of my singing,
— Hesiod, Theogony, 22-34, Trans, Lattimore.
Here again is described a ritual, a kind of initiation rite, in which
are instructions to always refer to the Muses at the beginning and
end of his singing. These instructions, if properly carried out,
act as a guarantee that feesiod*s multiplicities of singings will be
cradled in the identity of his origin as a singer. Insofar as the
■ Muses are Immortal goddesses,; Hesiod has good reason not to forget
these instructions, since carrying them out places him in the position
of singing with cosmic significance. We might wonder what would
happen if Hesiod either forgets or deliberately refuses to include
the Kuses specifically in his singing. Obviously, his singing would
no longer be Kousikê, i.e., no longer pertain to the Muses. And
since the Muses are the daughters of Memory, we must assume that
Hesiod*s singing would :no- longer be memorable— that is, worthy of
• being remembered.
Consider then the birth of a Kwakiutl Indian songrnaker, the
testimony of Charlie Howell:
From the time I am first put in my cradle, they be watching 
for the string to come off from the button of my belly.
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If you want your baby to be a canoemakcr, they give it 
to a man to put on his wrist while he is making a canoe.
They gave mine to my father, and he put it on his 
right wrist while singing. They say they took me out of 
my cradle and wrapped me up and put me inside a wooden 
drum. He began to hit the drum with his fists and began 
to sing. He put me in the drum and sing like this four 
times to make me like he was— a maker of songs, I could 
have been like him, and I '-as when I was a young man,
I made winter dance songs and love songs, but we don^t 
make them any more,20
The Kjîakiutl paid close attention to the significance of grounding
the songrnaker*s identity in a specific act of ritual. Because of
this and also because of the critical importance of the memory in
Kwakiutl songmaking, I am taking the liberty of referring henceforth
to Kwakiutl ^usi<^ as Kwakiutl "mousikê,” since it is evident that
Kwakiutl songs as phenomena were functioning in the same manner as
Greek Kousikê,
20 ciellan S, Fold, Smoke from their Fires, the Life of a 
Kwakiutl Chief (New Haven, Conn,: Yale University Press, 1941),
p. 45.
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CHAPTER VI 
KWAKIUTL 'n-iOUSIKE"
One of the most significant things about Kwakiutl "mousikê" 
is the specific identification of place. Equally significant is 
that a Kwakiutl song always belongs to someone in particular. It 
is his song, he is in the song, and along with this special ownership 
go all the rights and privileges of performance, which are, literally, 
the rights to transfer the song to another as a gift.
Very often Kwakiutl songs are contained in boxes, as for example 
the songs used in the winter ceremonial. When a cedar box contains 
the masks for the Thunderbird. dance, it is said that the dance itself 
is in the box. So, too, is the song. By giving the box of para- 
phenalia to another, a Kwakiutl makes a gift of more than meets the 
eye; by intent he gives "mousikê", which includes the song, the 
dance, the masks, the rights of performance, and knowledge or "memory" 
of correct performance, including the direct access to supernatural 
assistance. The importance of correct performance becomes more evident 
by considering its mythical referent.
Dr. Halpem was able to record Kwakiutl songs only after 
considerable patience and understanding, since finally her recording 
of the songs vas tantamount to her being considered worthy to receive 
them as a personal gift. We who listen to the records are of course 
robbers. See monograph to FoDd^ays Ethnic Library, FE 4^23, p. 5»
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The Kwakiutl people comprise more than twenty tribes, and each 
tribe is subdivided into several numayma (similar to clans), "The 
ancestor of a numayma (sometimes also of a tribe) appeared at a spe­
cific locality by coming down from the sky, out of the sea, or from 
underground, generally in the form of an animal, took off his animal 
mask, and became a person...The Thunderbird or his brother..,, the 
gull, the Killer Whale, a sea monster, a grizzly bear, and a ghost
ppchief appear in this role," The cross-identity of men and animals 
is revealed. One nurnaym claim that another numaym "stole their wolf 
dance when they found the box containing the wolf m a s k s , "^3 Losing 
their wolf dance represents for that numaym a rather serious loss of 
prestige, since the box containing the wolf masks must be understood 
as a magic treasure obtained from supernatural beings. In another 
instance "a hunter steals the mask of the Grizzly Bear who begs for 
its return and gives in exchange the grizzly bear winter dance,
The "mousikê" of the Kwakiutl is not a peculiarly human mode 
of being-in-the-worldÎ it is rather a manifestation of organic inter­
relationships between human beings, animals, myth-people, and natural 
"objects", such as rocks, trees, the sea, etc. These inter-rela­
tionships exemplify the being-with-the-.'crld which these "creatures
22 Franz Boas, Kwakiutl Ethnography, ed, by Helen Codere (Chicago:
r T 9TSTTp 7̂ 2,University of Chicago Press
^3 Boas, Kwakiutl Culture, p. 67. 
2^ Ibid,, p. 80,
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and things” enjoy. The playfulness displayed in these relationships
is evident, for example a woman of the tribe called the Sandstone
Ones was given this song when she dreamed about the Sun:
Don*t let us hesitate to dance with our Lord., 
The-One-to-whom-we-Pray, haai* haai* haai*a haai' haai*  ̂haai»,25
We must not here (nor elsewhere) confuse sacred play or playful­
ness vTith irresponsibility. For the Kwakiutl, there is a right way 
of playing which is not only ethically correct but perhaps more im­
portant, ecologically valid. Consider, for example, a prayer to the 
Salmon. l-Then a man spears a sockeye salmon, he hauls it into his 
canoe, and after clubbing it once ritually and removing the spear 
point, he holds up the salmon with both hands and addresses it 
directly:
We have come to meet alive, Swimmer. Do not feel wrong 
about what I have done to you, friend Swi*nmer, for that 
is the reason why you come that I may spear you, that I 
may eat you. Supernatural One, you, Long-Life-Giver, 
you, St-d-mmer, No^ protect us, (me) and my wife, that we 
may keep well, that nothing may be difficult for us that 
we wish to get from you, Rich-Maker4'/oraan. Now call 
after you your father and your mother and uncles and aunts 
and elder brothers and sisters to come to me also, you.
Swimmers, you Satiater.^^
Arriving back home with the salmon catch, the man*s wife then pre­
pares a fresh Timt in the house upon which the salmon are placed. 
Sitting do'm alongside the mat, the wife picks up one of the salmon
25 Franz Boas, The Religion of the Kwakiutl Indians, Part II: 
Translations, Columbia University Contributions to Anthropology,
Vol. X (Hew York: Columbia University Press, 1930), p. I83.
Ibid.. p. 207.
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with her left hand. In her right hand is her fishknife. She addresses 
the sal-non ;
Welcome, Supernatural One, you, Swiiraner, you have come 
trying to come to me, you, who always corns every year 
of our world, that you come to set us right that we may 
be well. Thank you* thank you sincerely, you Swimmer.
I mean this, that you, please, will co-i® next year that 
ve may meet alive, that you, please, protect me that 
nothing evil may befall ms, Supernatural One, you.
Shimmer, Kow I will do what you came here for that I 
should do to you,^7
It is clear from this example that the Kwakiutl understood 
the notion of ecological balance, which to a human being spells the 
difference betx'.’een being-x;ith-the-world (as & bona fide member of 
the world-order in the concrete sense) and merely bsing-in-the-worid 
(as an alien, real or potential). This ceremony, which is play 
with cosmic intent, is the Kwakiutl's awareness of the ecological 
balance, Tx̂ o aphorisms were offered earlier: 1. ^iusicj of archaic
man is play. 2. Since archaic man’s language is concrete, it is 
playful, too. In both cases the game is to play along xdth the world, 
for as Huizinga puts it: ’’Play is older than culture, for culture,
however inadequately defined, always presupposes human society, 
and animals have not waited for man to teach thorn their playing.
"Play cannot be denied. You can deny, if you like, nearly all 
abstractions: justice, beauty, truth, goodness, mind, God. You
27 Ibid., p. 207.
2^ Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p. 1,
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can deny seriousness, but not play."29 Archaic man made a practice
of actively pursuing this playfulness i-ihlch is the phenomenological
essence par excellence of his being-vith-the-world.
The K"akl\itl vinter ceremonial clearly takes place in mythical
time, Head-Wolf*s speech:
*Mow welcome, great friends, sit down comfortable in 
your seats. Come, friend,* said he, as he called by
names the dancers, *Gome and take care of us in this
house which has become different on the ground beginning 
this night; and you also, all (you) friends, you have 
come into this assembly house which has become different 
on the ground, my house for the winter ceremonial.*30
Every effort is made to eradicate the memory of their profane history.
This is accomplished by the elaborateness of the ritualistic pro­
cedures of purification as well as by the changing of everyone*s 
names. Even the secular aristocratic structure gives way to the set of 
patterns based on the ownership of sacred privleges.
It is clear that vrith the change of name the -'hole social 
structure, which is based on the names, must break down.
Instead of being grouped in clans, the Indians are now 
grouped according to the spirits which have initiated them,
The winter ceremonial is the Kwakiutl t'ay of setting the world
aright, using the mode of operation closest to themselves, i.e.,
Ibid,, p, 3.
30 Boas, Religion of the Kwakiutl, p. 65,
31 Franz Boas, "Secret Societies," p. 1^8, quoted by Eliade
in Rites and Symbols of Initiation, trans, by Willard R. Trask (hew York: 
Harper and Row, 1965), P. 152.
32 Boas, Kwakiutl Culture, p. 73.
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reinstating their identity, thus setting themselves aright vith 
the world.
The thematic intent of the winter ceremonial is most interesting.
That the responsibilities of individuals are great is well documented.
For example, mistakes in songs or dances are punishable by fines.
Worse than the fine, to the Kwakiutl, is that an error in performance
brings shame on the one who fails.
A chief is ashamed because his daughter who was to be 
initiated, dies by an accident and does not return.
The people are put to shame on account of an accident 
in the winter dance. They leave and become an inland 
tribe.32
But in spite of the seriousness which accompanies an error in per­
formance, the thematic intent of the winter ceremonial is an attitude 
of playfulness. The acts of distributing paraphenalia display this 
intent, Head-Wolf brings in the tallow and says:
’Indeed, friends, shall I not go on and announce this 
sound of ray privilege with ray sacred song, that I may 
bring the supernatural power to come into this tallow?’ 
said he as he sang his sacred song, shaking his rattle.
As soon as his sacred song was ended he said, ’op, op, 
op,* Then he said, ’Now, this tallow vill go that you 
may rub it on your faces, friends, to remove your secular 
faces,’ said he, Now & number of men vent and took the 
tallow and distributed it among the dancers,then 
Head-Wolf spoke again and said, ’0 friends no"' the super­
natural power has gone into this tallow and your minds 
will change.’33
In like manner follows the owner of the privilege of distributing
32 Boas, Kwakiutl Culture, p. 73.
33 Boas, Religion of the Kwakiutl, p. 66.
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the shredded cedar bark which wipes off the secular faces. After this 
is done. Head-Wolf speaks again thus:
•No", this is done, friends, now you have wiped off 
your summer faces; now you have wiped off your sick­
ness; and you have wiped off your quarrels; now you have 
wiped off your troubles. Now you will put on the happy 
maker on your faces, I mean this, now come friend Sea- 
Hunter-Body, you who own the privilege of taking care 
of the charcoal,’34
...and even
when a man has sorro*" fresh
in the troublement of his spirit 
and is struck to wonder over the grief 
in his heart, the singer, 
the servant of the Muses singing 
the glories of the ancient 
men, and the blessed gods
who have their homes on Olympos, 
makes him presently forget his cares, 
he no longer remembers 
sorrow, for the gifts of the goddesses 
soon turn his thoughts elsewhere,
— Hesiod, Theogony, 97-103, trans. Lattimore,
These blessings ho gave:
laughter to the flute
and the loosing of cares
when the shining wine is spilled
at the feast of the gods,
and the wine-bowl casts its sleep
on feastsrs crowned vdth ivy,
— Euripides, The Bacchae, 379-385» 
trans. Arrowsmith.
It is clear that the winter ceremonial of the K^-akiutl is fun.
Indeed, the one necessary ingredient of playfulness is that it be
an activity that is fun. An error in ceremonial performance interrupts
the fun, for it interjects a note of utmost seriousness into the
34 Ibid,, p, 6?.
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course of play. The Kwakiutl devised a way of coping with this ser­
iousness in order to maintain the thematic intent of playfulness.
For example, when a dancer stumbles and falls, he is obliged to
pretend to drop dead, for it is said that "the winter ceremonial 
jumped out of his body and took his strength to the winter ceremonial 
of the woods,"̂ -5 Should the dancer neglect this obligation, one of 
the officials pretends to kill him.
He carries a Sparrow staff, which has the form of a 
lance. A knife which slips readily into the staff is
attached to its end. iVhen stabbing the neck of the fallen
dancer, he pulls the knife back by means of a string.
Concealed in the shaft of the lance is a bladder or piece 
of bottle kelp containing blood. When the knife is pulled 
back it cuts the receptacle and the blood flows over the 
dancer*s nock. Some of these staffs are made like tongs,
When the neck of the fallen dancer is struck the tongs 
open and blood flows out of a hidden bladder,
The "dead" dancer is then removed ceremoniously. He disappears
and is initiated into rebirth by Cannibal-at-North-End-of-the-World.
To archaic ina.n death and error are in themselves both artless, 
for they bring shame to identity,^? an identity which is disclosed 
in his playing with a playful world. And as "mousikê" is not solely 
a human concern, i.e., "mousikê" doe^ not appear as a human invention, 
neither is shams a purely human attitude. For as shame follows a
35 Boas-Codere, Kwakiutl Ethnography, p, 280.
36 Ibid,. p. 280.
37 Kwakiutl culture has been categorized by anthropologists 
as a shame-culture because of the prominence awarded to the idea 
of prestige, (See Boas, Kwakiutl Culture, p. 72 ff,) The same 
concept has been applied to the Homeric age of the Greeks. (See 
E.R, Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, pp. 28 ff.)
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loss of prestige, shame indicates that the intended identity has 
been jsapordized.
The mountain goats hang their heads because an unin­
itiated human being has seen them dancing vithout their
skins,38
Thunderbird is jealous of Woodpecker vhose wife produced 
berries by her song.3?
A chief is ashamed because the trees praise the greatness 
of his rival.40
The mountain goat, Thunderbird, man: each must live up to his ovm
identity and vhen each succeeds there is an ecological balance, sines 
the various identities are interlocked in cosmic identity and play.
38 Boas, Kwakiutl Culture, p. 73.
39 Ibid., p. 70.
Ibid.. p. 72.
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”nor silence yet these songs. I did not make them 
that they might rest in sleep."
— Pindar, Isthmia 2, 9.3-4, trans, Lattimore.
'%ke for them the high strain of song, 
and praise old wine, but the blossoms of poetry
that i s young..."
— Pindar, Olympia 9, 5.9-6.1, trans. Lattimore,
'lien prefer the song which is newest to them 
listening"
— Homer, Odyssey, 1.351-2, trans. Beye.
CHAPTER VII
FOmiED CONCLUSION
The question must finally be raised explicitly;: Do the Muses
still sing, and if so, through whom? The untroubled spirit can supply
the quick and easy answer of subjective relativism: Each to his oim
Muse. Unfortunately this assessment requires the potential existence of
several billion Kuses to account for its solipsistic leanings. Even
though true solipsism is but an imaginary construct, Franz Kafka,
writing in the 1930's, gave us this deeply pessimistic view in a
very short story entitled Couriers:
They were offered the choice between becoming kings or 
the couriers of kings. The way children would, they all 
wanted to be couriers. Therefore there are only couriers 
who hurry about the world, shouting to each other— since 
there are no kings— messages that have become meaningless.
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They would like to put an end to this miserable life 
of theirs but they dare not because of their oaths of 
service,
Trans, by Clement Greenberg.
Nowadays at the end of the I960*s, a Kafka-like view has become more 
or less thematic to the common tongue. The fear and discomfort 
arising out of ’’meaninglessness" and "alienation" are widespread, and 
the fact of their being widespread is no comfort, either. Many are 
concerned and many continue to search for a ray of hope. The situation 
is faced in different ways. As homo sapiens we are confused, no 
longer sure-footed rationalists. As homo faber (Man the Maker) 
we still put some trust in our abilities to fabricate solutions to 
problems, A few of us regard the solution to the problem of "meaning­
lessness" as being no different from the solution to the problem of 
getting men on the moon.
In Kafka’s terms, we ask: Are there now only individual singers,
since the Muses are gone? And are the songs meaningless? In view 
of the present situation, it would be unthinkable to anst-rer with an 
unqalified "no," % a t  does it mean to say the Kuses are gone?
We recall that the Kuses, as presented in Hesiod, are exemplifications 
of the functions of the memory. We are aware of a functioning 
memory, then surely we are aware of the Kuses. But what is their 
• manner of appearing?
Recalling Hesiod agin, the Kuses said to him:
’You shepherds of the wilderness, poor fools, 
nothing but bellies, 
we know how to say many false things 
that seem like true sayings,
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but we know also how to speak the truth 
when we wish to.*
— Theogony, 26-23, trans, Lattimore, 
Insofar as we are aware of ’’meaninglessness,’* it is evident that 
the Kuses are fe<éding us false sayings. VJhy? Because we are not 
worthy of the truth? Such an ansi-ier comes easily. It assumes that 
we are not worthy because we are guilty; it assumes a fallen condition—  
the huTian condition. The trouble with guilt is that Western civili­
zation has managed to live with it for well over two thousand years. 
Guilt has become for many an empty abstraction, a piece of excess 
baggage. Surely ’’being worthy” to accept the gift of the Muses is 
a matter of choice. We can choose as archaic man did, to play with 
and within the world. So doing does not guarantee a priori truth, but 
it keeps us in preparedness to receive truth when the Kuses give it.
For every one good thing the immortals bestow on men
two evils. Men who are as children cannot take this 
becomingly;
but good men do, turning the brightness outward.,
— Pindar, Pythia 3. 11.6-8, trans, 
Lattimore.
Also whatever appears now as meaningless may once have had meaning.
The meaning is forgotten. It is like the ritual which outlasts the 
memory of its original mythical event. The song is ended but the 
melody lingers on. Can we recover lost meaning? Is it accessible 
through the memory? Phenomenologically we can ansifer this in the 
affirmative, since the meaning refers to this world and no other. 
Somewhere in the back woods of our consciousness lies the possibility
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of disclosing lost weaning. We may regard this possibility as being 
lodged in the remnants of the archaic consciousness. The difficulty 
in pursuing this lost weaning is the barricade of abstract concepts 
that acts as a screen vhich holds back what we are really after. It 
is the thematic intent of phenomenology to remove this screen in order 
to gain direct access to this world.
To play with and within the world as homo ludens, Man the Player, 
is svdft and dangerous. It has always been so, but it is more 
particularly dangerous now because of the screen of abstraction.
Modern homo ludens can undertake to enter mythical time directly just 
as archaic wan did, but unlike archaic man who made the journey equipped 
with supernatural paraphenalia, modern man must go in naked and 
unpurified, ready or not, to suffer the consequences. Archaic man 
here gives us a vision of the consequences.
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1, DIONYSUS, I-TIKK AMD VIRGIL THOMSON 
Cadmus
We implore you, Dionysus, We have done wrong,
Dionysus
Too late. When there was tine, you did not know me,
Cadmus
We have learned. Bit your sentence is too harsh,
Dionysus
I am a god, I was blasphemed by you.
Cadmus
Gods should be exempt from human passions,
Dionysus
Long ago my father Zeus ordained these things,
— Euripides, The Bacchae, 13^-13^91 
trans. Arrowsmith.
With one voice they cried aloud:
*0 lacchus! Son of Zeus!* *0 Bromiusl* they cried
until the beasts and all the mountain seemed
wild with divinity. And when they ran,
everything ran i-rlth them.
— Euripides, The Bacchae, 72L-728.
*At this we fled 
and barely missed being torn to pieces by the women.
Unarmed, they swooped dow upon the herds of cattle 
grazing there on the green of the meadow. And then 
you could have seen a single woman -ith bare hands tear 
a fat calf, still bello^tng with fright in two, "'hile 
others clawed the heifers to pieces. There -ere ribs 
and cloven hooves scattered every'here, and scraps smeared 
with blood hung from the fir trees. And bulls, their
raging fury gathered in their horns, lowered their heads
to charge, then fell, stumbling to the earth, pulled doTTi 
by hordes of women and stripped of flesh and skin more 
quickly, sire, than you could blink your royal eyes.*
— Euripides, The Bacchae, 733“7̂l'7.
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As for the quality content of rock music, let me cormuent 
only that its lovers tend to behave like addicts. But 
for that matter, so did the 'cats' and 'alligators' of 
the 1930s listening to swing played by name-bands.
— Virgil Thomson, N Y Review,
June 19, 1969. p. 33.
He (Mink) covered his face with his black bear blanket 
hung all over with shells of clams, as he was squatting 
down dancing, going to the right around the fire in the 
middle of the house. As soon as he arrived at the door­
way he began the words of his song in this -̂ay,
Ya ha ha, ya ha; ya ha ha, ya ha.
Mink is wearing over his face the middle of the 
face of Wolf. Ya ha ha, ya ha.
As soon as the song had words, Mink lowered his hand 
so that the head of theddublb-headed serpent was seen 
sitting on his head. A s soon as all the Myth people saf-r 
the double-headed serpent their bodies became contorted 
for a while,
— Boas, Religion of the Kwakiutl, p. 91.
Then Kink ran out of the dooi^ay. Then he took off the 
head of the double-headed serpent which was sitting on 
his head. He took the head of the eldest one of the 
princes of Wolf and put it on his head. Then he covered 
his face with his hands as he was dancing into the house.
He was dancing around the fire in the middle of the house.
As soon as he arrived at the doorr-’ay there began the words 
of the song of Mink,
Ya ha ha, ya ha, ya ha ha, ya ha.
Mink is wearing over his face the princes of Wolf, 
ya ha ha, ya ha.
That was, it is said, when they stopped their song and 
the four friends ran out together, that is Mink,for they
escaped from the Wolves when Mink lo’-’ered his hands and
when the Wolves sa^ plainly the late prince sitting on 
the head of Mink, the head that had been cut off. Now 
the Wolves in vain pursued Kink and his three friends.
The Wolves did not get them. Now all the Myth people 
went out after this. Then they were ashamed and they 
just scattered. No’' they left Crobked-Beach after this.
They did not live together after this on account of what 
had been done by Kink, the great beginning of the Sparrows.
Now they were no more men after this. Now some arc quad­
rupeds, others birds on account of what was done by K'ax, 
the Mink.
Boas, Religion of the Kwakiutl, p. 91-92.
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But she was foaming at the mouth, and her crazed eyes 
rolling with frenzy. She was mad, stark mad, possessed 
by Bacchus. Ignoring his cries of pity, she seized his 
left arm at the wrist; then, planting her foot upon his 
chest, she pulled, wrenching away the arm at the shoulder—  
not by her strength, for the god had put inhuman 
power in her hands, Ino, meanwhile, on the other side, 
was scratching off his flesh. Then Autonoe and the whole 
horde of Bacchae swarmed upon him. Shouts everyi-here, 
he screaming with what little breath r-ras left, they 
shrieking in triumph. One tore off an arm, another a 
foot still warm in its shoe. His ribs were clawed clean 
of flesh and every hand was smeared with blood as they 
played ball ■'d.th scraps of Pentheus* body.
The pitiful
remains lie scattered, one piece among the sharp rocks, 
others lying lost among the leaves in the depths of the 
forest. His mother, picking up his head, impaled it on 
her wand, §he seems to think it is some mountain lion's 
head which she carries in triumph through the thick of 
Cithaeron.
— Euripides, The Bacchae, 1121-1143,
The rhythm formerly kno’-m as rock-and-roll, nowadays as 
rock, has lately been the subject of dithyramb in the press 
and of ecstatic cries even from musicians. I am sure 
there must be excellence in some of it, Hot in the 
rhytbnic patterns, however, which are likely to be over- 
simple and quite monotonous, having early got crystal!zed 
that way for serving a public aged nine to fourteen.
Their monotony has nevertheless facilitated poetic expan­
sion, so that -̂e have now in Bob Dylan, for instance, a 
current-0vents verbal content comparable in wit and in 
forthrightness to that of Caribbean calypso. Unfor­
tunately that same monotony invites, as a substitute of 
pain for tediun, high amplification. As a result, I 
have not looked far in rock for masterpieces. Mostly 
the numbers I have heard have been flawed by rhythmic 
poverty and by an over-insistent level of delivery,
— Virgil Thomson, N Y Revle'-, p. 33.
They said that Dionysus was no son of Zeus, but Semele 
had slept beside a man in love and fathered off her shame 
on Zeus— a fraud, they sneered, contrived by Cadmus to 
protect his daughter's name. They said she lied, and 
Zeus in anger at that lie blasted her with lightening.
Because
of that offense I have stung them with frenzy, hounded
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them from home up to the mountains 'rhere they --ander, 
crazed of mind, and compelled to vear my orgies* livery.
— Euripides, The Eacchae, 28-3^.
Cadmus the king has abdicated, 
leaving his throne and pô êr to his grandson Pentheus;
:Tho no"'* revolts against divinity, in me; 
thrusts ^  from his offerings; forgets mg] name 
in his prayers. Therefore I shall prove to him 
and every man in Thebes that I am god 
indeed, And ■''dien my worship is established here, 
and all is •''ell, then I shall go my i:ay 
and be revealed to other men in other lands,
— Euripides, The Bacchae, ^3-50,
'•A century T-̂ here the only gods are immediately useful, 
and grô T angry only as their worshipers do,”
— Leroi' Jones,
Here ends homo ludens.
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2. PHEKOMEîIOLOGY AND •’IIOUSIKÊ"
I feel obliged to discuss the affinity (hinted at earlier, see 
above p, 7) bet^'een archaic ’’mousike” and the phenomenological 
method itself.
As v e have seen, phenomenology is an attempt to rediscover the 
vorld, this vorld. Insofar as our consciousness of the vorld is 
framed by patterns of thought I'hich "intellectualise” or "mathematiae" 
the world, phenomenology makes thematic the intent to disclose these 
patterns which are limiting factors in order to gain direct access 
to phenomena ^  immediately presented to consciousness. The 
point is, if the phenomenological method is used correctly, we should 
undergo a fuller awareness of phenomena than we are ordinarily 
accustomed.
The question I wish to ask is this; Did archaic "mousikeV 
as intended by archaic man perform the same function in archaic 
times as is the aim of phenomenology today? At this stage my ans-̂ er 
is a qualified "yes,” The major issue of qualification stems from 
the differences in the cultural points of view. Archaic "mousike”, 
functioning in a mythical context, enjoyed the power of collective 
consciousness. The individual v:as responsible, as an individual, 
for correct performance, but he was also assured that those about 
him knew and cared. Phenomenology, on the other hand, emerges in 
a society which caters to solipsism,
"Mousike" as a re-assertion of primordial Being is a process
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in the oral tradition vhich remembers its exemplary model. The 
memory is thematically recognized as a playful device. Phenomenology, 
on the other hand, comes -nithin the ■written tradition, and insofar 
as it is an activity of philosophy, homo sapiens has thematic priority 
over homo ludens,
"l'iousikê" can fall into decay by becoming overly self-conscious. 
Homo ludens, the very source of its po^er, can also be "mouslke*s" 
call to abstraction. There can be no denial that *' ^muslcj for 
^music*sj sake" can be fun, but its presence is at the same time 
a distraction from "mousike", "Kousikê" ans'wers the question 
"v‘/hy is there [music^ ?" vith a display of testamentary conviction. 
Phenomenologists would like to ansvv̂ er the question "LJhy is there 
Being?" with the best precision homo sapiens has at his disposal.
Can phenomenology be playful? Can "raousike" be philosophical? 
Would cross-pollination between "mousike" and phenomenology be ad­
visable? This thesis may be said to have pursued this possibility.
There is one final question to be raised. Does any "mousike" 
exist right now? Solipsistically of course the ans-wer can be "yes," 
Indeed, I could answer ■’■dth a song and dance. But since I can also 
deny it and since under the rules of solipsism my world is the world, 
any answer is futile, Solipsism is an abstract game.
The question is better put in Kwakiutl terms, for example;
To whom does the grizzly bear ai-iard his dance? Whom do the trees 
praise? It would not surprise me to discover the grizzly bear 
awarding his dance to the trees and the trees, in turn, praising
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the grizzly. As for my fellow man, I am ashamed to report that he 
considers the grizzly almost more trouble than he can bear, and that 
his noise level generally overpowers anything the trees might have 
to say. His ^music"̂  deafens ’’mousike".
Here ends homo sapiens.
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3. KAFKA'S SEQUEL 
OR
THE MUSES are NOT AFRAID TO USE FOUR-LETTER WORDS
After they had de-mythologized most everything in sight, they 
grew weary of carrying messages around. Then, too, there were no 
longer enough trees from '?hich to manufacture paper. The messages, 
which had formerly been recopled from, time to time on a fresh scroll, 
were being lost. Many were forced to commit their messages to memory. 
No one was happy. Then someone invented the computer and announced 
that he was going to build a computer big enough so that it would 
carry the messages of everyone in the world and still have plenty 
of room left over. And so it was done, and with the burden of carrying 
messages lifted from everyone's minds, the people began to poke 
around, hoping to dig up lost messages and put them in the computer. 
Then someone said, "What are we doing this for? We're not 
couriers anymore. We're kings1 We’re all kingsl We're free! Now 
the computer is our courier, and we can direct our oim messages for 
it to carry," The idea was popularly taken up. People sent in 
messages as fast as they could invent them. Several times the com­
puter had to be enlarged. Then one day the grim truth appeared,
- The computer's caretakers realized that it was no longer feasible 
to enlarge the computer. But they also realized that they couldn’t 
afford to tell this fact to the people-kings. So they devised a 
plan. They instructed the computer to continue to accept and store
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all new messages, but to begin an updating function. It worked like 
this. When a message in storage had not been requested for a spe­
cified period of time, that message was to be discontinued. The 
caretakers had to keep the plan a secret, since otherwise there 
would always be some troublemaker who would request esoteric messages 
just to keep them from being deleted.
The plan worked for quite awhile, but it didn't solve the pro­
blem in any fundamental sense. It only bought time. Eventually 
the population explosion, accompanied by an information explosion, 
outpaced the computer's capacities. The computer then ceased to 
accept any new information. The people-kings were now kings without 
couriers.
There came one among them, saying, "Ours is a time for re­
definition, Ours is a time for interpretation. We must sift through 
the accumulated information and find a new way to collate and codify 
this data, so that we can once again proceed to invest in our future 
with the kind of meaningful information which we all desire."
Here and there were murmurs of discontent, "Our leader's policy 
i-rill at best only buy a little more time, iJhat we should be asking
is; r̂tiy the devil do we have the computer anyway?"
A voice replied, "The computer is all we got, my friend.,"
"Look, what have we got? A sleeping giant with its memory
banks jam-packed full of the doodlings of idle kings,"
"I respect your opinion, but please calm dcÂ n a bit, l\fhat we 
desparately need is to sit dovm to some meaningful dialogue,"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
’’The devil take your respectl You’re so goddam desperate for 
dialogue you’d respect the opinion of a horse’s behind if you thought
you could gain any comfort from it."
"What strong words you use, my good fellow. You are an angry 
young man, then?"
"Ho, it is not I who am angry. As for my own part, I would 
be kept silent by my shame. But riy gods are angry, even flatulent 
with rage. They speak through me. We who are beyond dialogue cannot 
understand. But one day the truth will come to penetrate the nostrils 
of our Being. Mow may Zeus of the loud stroke zap you ''d.th a strong
stink, and as you writhe in discomfort, may you also be pelted in
like manner by Hera,,.Athene,.,Apollo.,.Mink,,,Seal,,,Salmon,,,
Grizzly Bear...and all the holy rest of the everlasting immortals."
Here ends homo faber.
"The conclusion you jump to may be your oim."
— James Thurber
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